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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent's statement of facts would only be a duplication 
of the Findings of Fact filed in this action and adopted by 
incorporation as part of Appellants Brief. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The Appellant has waived any point as to improper 
service both by the filing of his answer in the original 
proceeding and by failure to raise the issue at the trial level. 
2. The Respondents pleading gave adequate notice to the 
Appellant in that he pleaded facts upon which the court could 
find a unilateral rescission of the contract. The contract was 
still executory in that the parties had not been fully performed; 
delivery requires more than transfer of physical possession. 
3. Notwithstanding any defect in pleading the trial court 
has discretion to amend the pleading as provided by statute. The 
pleadings of the Defendant and the record of the trial should be 
considered in determining whether or not there was adequate 
notice and a fair hearing afforded. 
4. The agreement between the Respondent and Appellant did 
not constitute a security agreement in that the formalities 
required by law had not been satisfied. The appellant attempts 
to use the term contract and security agreement interchangeably 
to obtain the result he desires. By embracing two theories which 
largely cancel one another, the Defendant is able to espouse 
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neither. If the appellant prevails on his contention that he 
retained an interest in the property until he was paid in full 
does he not in fact admit that there was a rescission. If the 
Appellant retained no title how does he justify the retaking of 
physical possession of the property. Even assuming a security 
agreement, there was no compliance with statutes governing 
repossession and sale by which the interest of Respondent was 
liquidated and the court is left to fashion a remedy based on the 
equities of the case. 
5. In all of his arguments the Defendant ignores the fact 
that by his actions he left the court with no alternative but to 
view the transaction as rescinded since there was no other basis 
presented by the facts on which the court could justly liquidate 
the obligations of the parties one to the other. 
6. The Defendant failed wholly in an attempt to justify 
claims of surprise, newly discovered evidence or errors in law. 
7. Respondent is entitled to double costs and attorney's 
fees on account of this frivolous and dilatory appeal. 
POINT I 
THERE WAS NO ERROR IN THE COURTS REFUSAL TO GRANT APPELLANTS 
MOTION TO DISMISS AT THE CLOSE OF RESPONDENTS CASE. 
Rule 15<b)of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides a 
liberal scheme of amendment with much latitude whereby the court 
may obtain a full presentation of the merits of the case at 
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trial. In COLEMAN v. COLEMAN 67 Ut Adv. Rep. 7 (Ct. App. 
10/02/87) this court held that issues not raised by the pleadings 
may be tried by express or implied consent of the parties and 
that those issues shall be treated as if raised by the pleadings. 
Examining the record of this case, there is certainly no doubt as 
to the time, consideration and subject matter of the contract. 
We see that in Plaintiff's pleadings at paragraph 2, the 
equipment is described as; 
" one International Harvester Tractor model 
706 and one pair of John Deere twin rakes 
models 270 and 271 with cart" 
The time is set forth as "on or about the 7th day of June 
1986M. The amount of consideration as paid by Plaintiff to 
Defendant is listed as $5,500.00, (Respondents exhibit I). 
Any doubt as to whether the transaction is identifiable is 
largely dispelled by Defendants answer which alleges " that 
Plaintiff is indebted in the amount of $4,500.00 with interest 
from and after June 7th, 1986". (Respondents exhibit II). To 
adequately plead a cause of action a party need only present a 
short and plain statement of his claim and demand for relief; see 
ROSENLOF v- SULLTVAN 676 P2d 372 (12/12/83) Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure 8(a) 
At trial Plaintiff put on his case that he had purchased 
goods for $10,000.00 (T.14), that Plaintiff traded machinery to 
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Defendant at an agreed value of SS^OO.OO1 and a balance of 
$4,500.00 remained (Respondents exhibit III). Plaintiff further 
proved that Defendant had retaken the equipment (P.55), but that 
Defendant had made no effort to return Plaintiff's equipment. 
Defendant made no objection to this proffered evidence but did, 
at the close of Plaintiff's case, move to dismiss, apparently on 
the grounds that the Plaintiff had failed to prove non-delivery 
(T.25, 34). The court denied Defendant's motion and required 
that Defendant go forward with his case in chief which was 
comprised largely of affirmative defense type evidence 
(Respondents exhibit II). The court heard all of the evidence 
offered by Defendant that was within the rules of evidence. 
Defendant was in no way held to his failure to plead any 
affirmative defense. In COLEMAN v. COLEMAN (supra) this court 
said 
"If a theory of recovery is fully tried by 
the parties, the court may base its decision 
on that theory and deem the pleadings 
amended, even if the theory was not 
originally pleaded or set forth in the 
pleadings or the pretrial order. However, 
that the issue has, in fact, been tried, and 
that this procedure has been authorized by 
express or implied consent of the parties 
must be evident from the record. A trial 
court may not base its decision on an issue 
that was tried inadvertently. Implied 
consent to try an issue may be found where 
1
. The Plaintiff has not maintained and cannot maintain 
that the trade in property was not worth the value allowed in the 
transaction. 
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one party raises an issue material to the 
other party's case or where evidence is 
introduced without objection, or where it 
appears that the parties understood the 
evidence was to be aimed at the unpleaded 
issue. Thus, the test for determining 
whether pleading should be deemed amended 
under RCP-15(b) is whether the opposing party 
has had a fair opportunity to defend and 
whether it could offer additional evidence if 
the case were retried on a different theory". 
Applying the two part test in COLEMAN, is there really any 
possibility that Defendant could offer additional competent, 
material evidence which would be pivotal if the case were retried 
on a different theory? This issue will be addressed more fully 
in answering Defendant's contentions in his "Point III" but the 
answer is simply N0[. Given all that Defendant would offer by way 
of additional evidence the same result must obtain; Defendant has 
deprived Plaintiff of $5,500.00 by his unilateral act and 
Plaintiff is entitled to recompense. 
Considering the other part of the COLEMAN test - whether the 
Defendant had a fair opportunity to defend - the answer must be 
in the affirmative. Defendant did not move for a continuance, 
nor did Defendant object to any evidence offered as being beyond 
the scope of Plaintiff's pleadings. The court did not limit 
Defendant to his pleadings and most importantly, Defendant was 
prepared to defend the issue presented as evidenced by his 
pleadings (Respondents exhibit II). By Defendant's presentation 
of the law of the case (T.27,29) and by the evidence Defendant 
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put on in his case in chief, which was that Defendant considered 
the contract as executory and elected to rescind it, <T. 44) it 
is apparent that Defendant was not factually surprised or legally 
unprepared. It should be noted that the court afforded each 
party additional time after trial to address the question of 
whether or not a security agreement existed; an opportunity which 
each of the parties availed themselves of (Respondents exhibits 
IV and V). 
One must consider Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 8(b) when 
examining the sufficiency of the pleadings, giving due deference 
to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) in applying the standard 
upon which this court reviews findings of a trial judge. In 
CHENEY v. RUCKER 14 UT 2d 205, 211, 381 P2d 86, 91 (1963) the 
court discussed the rules of pleadings and noted; 
"They must all be looked to in light of their 
even more fundamental purpose of liberalizing 
both pleading and procedure to the end that 
the parties are afforded the privilege of 
presenting whatever legitimate contentions 
they have pertaining to their dispute. What 
they are entitled to is notice of the issues 
raised and an opportunity to meet them. When 
this is accomplished, that is all that is 
required. Our rules provide for liberality 
to allow examination into and settlement of 
all issues bearing upon the controversy, but 
safeguard the rights of the other party to 
have a reasonable time to meet a new issue if 
he so requests". 
The trial courts findings should be accorded great deference 
and should not be set aside unless those findings 
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"...are against the clear weight of the 
evidence or we otherwise reach a definite and 
firm conviction that a mistake has been 
made", (cases cited). 
See COVE EXCAVATING & CONST, CO. v. FLYNN 88 Ut.Adv. Rep. 6 
(10/16/88 C.A.). 
POINT II 
Appellant has waived any claim that there was improper or 
inadequate service or that there was inadequate notice of trial 
setting. 
Respecting the novel presentation of the issue as expounded 
in footnotes 1 and 2 at page 11 of Appellants brief and assuming 
by those notations that Appellant is attempting to raise the 
issue of service the Respondent can only answer by noting that if 
some defect in service was present, it is not apparent from the 
record on appeal nor was the issue preserved at the trial level. 
In SMITH v. VUICICH 699 P2d 763 8 Ut. Adv. Rep. 5 (1985) the 
court held that; 
"Where the record before the court is 
incomplete, it is unable to review the 
evidence as a whole and must therefore 
presume that the verdict was supported by 
admissable and competent evidence". 
See also BURKE v. BURKE 733 P2d 133; 43 Ut. Adv. Rep.11 (1986). 
In the recent case of WISDEN v. CITY OF SALINA 709 P2d 371, 
21 Ut. Adv. Rep 20 (10/20/85) This court refused to address the 
issue of improper service when it was first raised on appeal. 
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POINT III 
As are the arguments in Appellants Point I, the arguments 
in Point III are specious and the legal distinctions made by 
appellant are largely fabricated from a misjoinder of statutory 
law. 
Appellant assumes without explanation that the satisfaction 
of the requirements of UCA 70A-1-20K3) satisfies the 
requirements of 70A-9-201 et. seq. and particularly 70A-9-203. 
The sparsity of writing and lack of supplementary oral agreements 
that might® create the right of repossession and the right of 
disposition of collateral are largely glossed over by accusations 
of lack of "good faith" and "honesty". Somehow Appellant assumes 
that these alleged improper acts of Respondent excuse the 
departure from the formal requisites of a security agreement, the 
lack of which is admitted by Appellant in his brief (P. 15). One 
might ask in response to the Appellants contentions - what was 
the specific default of Respondent that triggered Appellants 
right to repossess - was it lack of good faith or honesty or 
both? How does Appellant propose to liquidate respondents 
interest in the equipment? Does Appellant deny that respondent 
has any remaining interest in the equipment - Respondent claims 
•• The Respondent argues otherwise and contends that each 
enforceable provision of a security agreement must be in writing 
and signed by the parties see HAGGIS MANAGEMENT INC. v. TURTLE 
MANAGEMENT INC. 19 Ut. Adv. Rep. 42 (10-03-85). 
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to have repossessed it - who now has title? Consider 
UCA 70A-2-401. 
POINT IV 
The actual point made by Defendant in his motion to dismiss 
at the close of Plaintiff's case was not that there was evidence 
offered on an issue not pleaded but was that since Plaintiff had 
admitted that for a short period he had physical possession of 
the subject equipment, there had been no prima facia showing of 
non-delivery and thus Defendant was entitled to a dismissal- It 
is generally the law that delivery requires more than physical 
transfer of possession of some item. BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 4th 
Ed. Rev, (1972) quotes MILLER v. HOSPELHORN 176 Md. 356, 4 A2d 
728 as holding; 
"What constitutes delivery depends largely on 
the intent of the parties. It is not 
necessary that delivery should be by manual 
transfer". 
In response to Defendant's contention in his Motion to 
Dismiss, Plaintiff argued to the trial court that there were two 
theories upon which Plaintiff could recover; conversion or 
conditional delivery and rescission3. In the case of SILLIMAN v. 
DOBNER 165 Minn. 87, 205 N.W. 696, 697 as cited in Blacks Law 
3
. Plaintiff could have also styled the action as one in 
Quasi-Contract, having waived the tort and relied on a 
"fictitious" sale to the converter (recovery in assumpsit) 
Plaintiff establishing the fair market value by relying on the 
recent transaction. 
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Dictionary (supra) the court held; 
"A conditional delivery is one which passes 
the thing subject to delivery from the 
possession of the grantor, but is not to be 
completed by possession of the grantee, or a 
third person as his agent, until the 
happening of a specified event". 
Appellant cannot maintain that just because Plaintiff had 
possession of the equipment at one time, that there had been an 
unconditional delivery, particularly in light of the subsequent 
acts of Appellant such as a retaking without notice or process 
and subsequent denial of any claim of interest by Plaintiff. 
Respecting Appellants claim of abuse of discretion in 
failure to grant a new trial the claim of surprise by Defendant 
is belied by the pleading and proceedings had at the trial level. 
Defendant in his pleadings and argument in connection with his 
Motion to Dismiss acknowledged a contract and a substantial 
payment. Defendant argued vigorously and cited the UCC verbatim 
to the proposition that the dealings of the parties and the 
existence of a balance owed by the Plaintiff to Defendant 
justified Defendant's retaking of the equipment and further 
maintained Defendant's right to retake without making 
restitution. 
The Defendant's claims of newly discovered evidence as 
justifying a new trial are these 
(a) Evidence that Defendant did not make 
attempts to secure financing in order to pay 
the balance owed to Defendant. 
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<b) Evidence that Plaintiff did not purchase 
equipment to replace the equipment retaken by 
Defendant. 
<c) Additional evidence that the recovery of 
the disputed equipment took place in November 
1986 not September 1986. 
<d) Evidence that during the approximate time 
of the retaking of the disputed equipment by 
Defendant, Plaintiff had additional equipment 
repossessed by John Deere Credit and/or other 
creditors. 
Respondent is constrained to ask - given a retaking without 
consent of Respondent, how could proof of each or any of these 
contentions assist Appellant. Further proof of <a) or (b) or 
(d) would only add support to the courts finding of a unilateral 
rescission. Proof relating to (c) would not be relevant to any 
issue except the veracity of the parties and there is remarkably 
little dispute as to the material facts necessary for decision in 
this case. 
The court gave the parties ample time to brief the law after 
the trial and before rendering a decision, the Respondent 
certainly cannot complain as to inadequate opportunity to present 
the law to the court. It seems that the court must have either 
i 
found a right of repossession or in the alternative have found a 
rescission or conversion. The Defendant did not show a right to 
repossession then and cannot show one now: given all of his 
"newly discovered evidence". In BARSON et al v. SQUIBB 682 P2d 
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832 (04/12/84) the court said; 
MA moving party must show three things in 
order for a new trial to be granted on the 
basis of newly discovered evidence: (a) there 
is material, competent evidence which is in 
fact newly discovered; <b> by due diligence 
the evidence could not have been discovered 
and produced at trial; and (c) the evidence 
must not be merely cumulative or incidental 
but must be of sufficient substance that 
there is a reasonable likelihood that with it 
there would have been a different result". 
Appellant has, even given credence to the claim that the 
evidence is newly discovered, made no showing that the evidence 
is competent or material. No discovery being evident from the 
file, it is difficult to maintain that due diligence was 
employed. Much of the new evidence is certainly cumulative only, 
if not repetitious and most importantly, none of the proposed 
evidence would be pivotal to the case. 
In GODDARD v. HICKMAN 685 P2d 530 (05/01/84) the court said; 
"A trial court has broad latitude in granting 
or denying a motion for a new trial, and will 
not be overturned on appeal absent a clear 
abuse of discretion". 
POINT V 
In BBIGHAM CITY v. MANTUA TOWN 83 Ut. Adv. Rep. 21 (Ct. App. 
05/24/88) this court said at page 26; 
"The record shows a deliberate course of 
conduct designed to frustrate the purposes of 
the parties' agreement and an attempt by 
Mantua to ^rewrite the whole contract'". 
In this action, has not the Defendant attempted to retain 
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what was his and to take what was Plaintiffs. Without resort to 
right founded in an agreement of the parties (written or oral) 
and without resort to process. The Plaintiff took the property 
of both of the parties and made it his. As might be expected 
this tactic did not withstand the test of legality or the view of 
the trial court aa to equity. Now the Appellant uses the vehicle 
of appeal to frustrate and delay inevitable restitution by asking 
this court to "rewrite the whole contract". 
Rule 33(a) of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals 
provides that; 
"If the court determines that a motion made 
or an appeal taken under these rules is 
either frivolous or for delay, it shall award 
just damages and single or double costs, 
including reasonable attorney fees, to the 
prevailing party". 
This is just such an appeal, frivolous and baseless. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court should be affirmed and as affirmed the case 
should be remanded to the trial court for a determination of 
Respondents attorneys feea and double costs of appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _&.„ day of October, 1988 
A r-Mhr Lauritszen 
Attorney fdp Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 6th day of October, 1988 I 
mailed four <4) copies of the foregoing Statement of Facts to 
Jeff R. Thome, Attorney for Defendant at 98 North Main, P. 0. 
Box "F", Brigham City, Utah 84302 
AVJtf^ Laxii 
Attorney 
en 
laintiff 
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667 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 70A-1-201 
70A-1-104. Construction against implicit repeal. 
This act being a general act intended as a unified 
coverage of its subject matter, no part of it shall be 
deemed to be impliedly repealed by subsequent legis-
lation if such construction can reasonably be avoided. 
1965 
70A-1-105. Territorial application of the act — 
Parties' power to choose applicable 
law. 
(1) Except as provided hereafter in this section, 
when a transaction bears a reasonable relation to this 
state and also to another state or nation the parties 
may agree that the law either of this state or of such 
other state or nation shall govern their rights and 
duties. Failing such agreement this act applies to 
transactions bearing an appropriate relation to this 
state. 
(2) Where one of the following provisions of this act 
specifies the applicable law, that provision governs 
and a contrary agreement is effective only to the ex-
tent permitted by the law (including the conflict of 
laws rules) so specified: 
Rights of creditors against sold goods. Section 
70A-2-402. 
Applicability of the chapter on Bank Deposits 
and Collections. Section 70A-4-102. 
Bulk transfers subject to the chapter on Bulk 
Transfers. Section 70A-6-102. 
Applicability of the chapter on Investment Se-
curities. Section 70A-8-106. 
Perfection provisions of the chapter on Secured 
Transactions. Section 70A-9-103. irn 
70A-1-106. Remedies to be liberally adminis-
tered. 
(1) The remedies provided by this act shall be lib-
erally administered to the end that the aggrieved 
party may be put in as good a position as if the other 
party had fully performed but neither consequential 
or special nor penal damages may be had except as 
specifically provided in this act or by other rule of 
law. 
(2) Any right or obligation declared by this act is 
enforceable by action unless the provision declaring it 
specifies a different and limited effect. lses 
70A-1-107. Waiver or renunciation of claim or 
right after breach. 
Any claim or right arising out of an alleged breach 
can be discharged in whole or in part without consid-
eration by a written waiver or renunciation signed 
and delivered by the aggrieved party. lses 
70A-1-108. Severability. 
If any provision or clause of this act or application 
• thereof to any person or circumstances is held in-
valid, such invalidity shall not affect other provisions 
or applications of the act which can be given effect 
without the invalid provision or application, and to 
this end the provisions of this act are declared to be 
severable. 19W 
70A-1-109. Section captions. 
Section captions are parts of this act. is«s 
PART 2 
GENERAL DEFINITIONS AND PRINCIPLES 
OF INTERPRETATION 
Section 
70A-1-201. General definitions. 
Section 
70A-1-202. Prima facie evidence by third-party doc-
uments. 
70A-1-203. Obligation of good faith. 
70A-1-204. Time — Reasonable time — "Season-
ably." 
70A-1-205. Course of dealing and usage of trade. 
70A-1-206. Statute of frauds for kinds of personal 
property not otherwise covered. 
70A-1-207. Performance or acceptance under reser-
vation of rights. 
70A-1-208. Option to accelerate at will. 
70A-1-201. General definitions. 
Subject to additional definitions contained in the 
subsequent chapters of this act which are applicable 
to specific chapters or parts thereof, and unless the 
context otherwise requires, in this act: 
(1) "Action" in the sense of a judicial proceed-
ing includes recoupment, counterclaim, setoff, 
suit in equity and any other proceedings in which 
rights are determined. 
(2) "Aggrieved party" means a party entitled 
to resort to a remedy. 
(3) "Agreement" means the bargain of the par« 
ties in fact as found in their language or by im-
plication from other circumstances including 
course of dealing or usage of trade or course of 
performance as provided in this act (Sections 
70A-1-205 and 70A-2-208). Whether an agree-
ment has legal consequences is determined by 
the provisions of this act, if applicable; otherwise 
by the law of contracts (Section 70A-1-103). 
(Compare "Contract.") 
(4) "Bank" means any person engaged in the 
business of banking. 
(5) "Bearer" means the person in possession of 
an instrument, document of title, or security pay-
able to bearer or indorsed in blank. 
(6) "Bill of lading" means a document evidenc-
ing the receipt of goods for shipment issued by a 
person engaged in the business of transporting or 
forwarding goods, and includes an airbill. "Air-
bill" means a document serving for air transpor-
tation as a bill of lading does for marine or rail 
transportation, and includes an air consignment 
note or air waybill. 
(7) "Branch" includes a separately incorpo-
rated foreign branch of a bank. 
(8) "Burden of establishing" a fact means the 
burden of persuading the triers of fact that the 
existence of the fact is more probable than its 
nonexistence. 
(9) "Buyer in ordinary course of business" 
means a person who in good faith and without 
knowledge that the sale to him is in violation of 
the ownership rights or security interest of a 
third party in the goods buys in ordinary course 
from a person in the business of selling goods of 
that kind but does not include a pawnbroker. All 
persons who sell minerals or the like (including 
oil and gas) at wellhead or minehead shall be 
deemed to be persons in the business of selling 
goods of that kind. "Buying" may be for cash or 
by exchange of other property or on secured or 
unsecured credit and includes receiving goods or 
documents of title under a pre-existing contract 
for sale but does not include a transfer in bulk or 
as security for or in total or partial satisfaction of 
a money debt. 
(10) "Conspicuous**: A term or clause is con-
spicuous when it is so written that a reasonable 
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(c) complies with the filing provisions of the 
chapter on Secured Transactions (chapter 9). 
(4) Any "or return" term of a contract for sale is to 
be treated as a separate contract for sale within the 
statute of frauds section of this chapter (Section 
70A-2-201) and as contradicting the sale aspect of the 
contract within the provisions of this chapter on parol 
or extrinsic evidence (Section 70A-2-202). 1965 
70A-2-327. Special incidents of sale on approval 
and aale or return. 
,(1) Under a sale on approval unless otherwise 
agreed 
. (a) although the goods are identified to the 
contract the risk of loss and the title do not pass 
to the buyer until acceptance; and 
(b) use of the goods consistent with the pur-
pose of trial is not acceptance but failure season-
ably to notify the seller of election to return the 
goods is acceptance, and if the goods conform to 
the contract acceptance of any part is acceptance 
of the whole; and 
(c) after due notification of election to return, 
the return is at the seller's risk and expense but 
a merchant buyer must follow any reasonable in-
structions. 
(2) Under a sale or return unless otherwise agreed 
(a) the option to return extends to the whole or 
any commercial unit of the goods while in sub-
stantially their original condition, but must be 
exercised seasonably; and 
(b) the return is at the buyer's risk and ex-
pense. 1964 
70A-2-328. Sale by auction. 
(1) In a sale by auction if goods are put up in lots 
each lot is the subject of a separate sale. 
(2) A sale by auction is complete when the auction-
eer so announces by the fall of the hammer or in other 
customary manner. Where a bid is made while the 
hammer is falling in acceptance of a prior bid the 
auctioneer may in his discretion reopen the bidding 
or declare the goods sold under the bid on which the 
hammer was falling. 
(3) Such a sale is with reserve unless the goods are 
in explicit terms put up without reserve. In an auc-
tion with reserve the auctioneer may withdraw the 
goods at any time until he announces completion of 
the sale. In an auction without reserve, after the auc-
tioneer calls for bids on an article or lot, that article 
or lot cannot be withdrawn unless no bid is made 
within a reasonable time. In either case a bidder may 
retract his bid until the auctioneer's announcement of 
completion of the sale, but a bidder's retraction does 
not revive any previous bid. 
(4) If the auctioneer knowingly receives a bid on 
the seller's behalf or the seller makes or procures 
such a bid, and notice has not been given that liberty 
for such bidding is reserved, the buyer may at his 
option avoid the sale or take the goods at the price of 
the last good faith bid prior to the completion of the 
sale. This subsection shall not apply to any bid at a 
forced sale. lses 
PART 4 
TITLE, CREDITORS AND GOOD 
FAITH PURCHASERS 
Section 
70A-2-401. Passing of title —• Reservation for secu-
rity — Limited application of this sec-
tion. 
Section 
70A-2-402. Rights of seller's creditors against sold 
goods. 
70A-2-403. Power to transfer — Good faith purchase 
of goods — "Entrusting." 
70A-2-401. Passing of title — Reservation for se-
curity — Limited application of this 
section. 
Each provision of this chapter with regard to the 
rights, obligations and remedies of the seller, the 
buyer, purchasers or other third parties applies irre-
spective of title to the goods except where the provi-
sion refers to such title. In so far as situations are not 
covered by the other provisions of this chapter and 
matters concerning title become material the follow-
ing rules apply: 
(1) Title to goods cannot pass under a contract 
for sale prior to their identification to the con-
tract (Section 70A-2-501), and unless otherwise 
explicitly agreed the buyer acquires by their 
identification a special property as limited by 
this act. Any retention or reservation by the 
seller of the title (property) in goods shipped or 
delivered to the buyer is limited in effect to a 
reservation of a security interest. Subject to these 
provisions and to the provisions of the chapter on 
Secured Transactions (Chapter 9), title to goods 
passes from the seller to the buyer in any manner 
and on any conditions explicitly agreed on by the 
parties. 
(2) Unless otherwise explicitly agreed title 
passes to the buyer at the time and place at 
which the seller completes his performance with 
reference to the physical delivery of the goods, 
despite any reservation of a security interest and 
even though a document of title is to be delivered 
at a different time or place; and in particular and 
despite any reservation of a security interest by 
the bill of lading 
(a) if the contract requires or authorizes 
the seller to send the goods to the buyer but 
does not require him to deliver them at desti-
nation, title passes to the buyer at the time 
and place of shipment; but 
(b) if the contract requires delivery at des-
tination, title passes on tender there. 
(3) Unless otherwise explicitly agreed where 
delivery is to be made without moving the goods, 
(a) if the seller is to deliver a document of 
title, title passes at the time when and the 
place where he delivers such documents; or 
(b) if the goods are at the time of contract-
ing already identified and no documents are 
to be delivered, title passes at the time and 
place of contracting. 
(4) A rejection or other refusal by the buyer to 
receive or retain the goods, whether or not justi-
fied, or a justified revocation of acceptance re-
vests title to the goods in the seller. Such revest-
ing occurs by operation of law and is not a "sale." 
196S 
70A-2-402. Rights of seller's creditors against 
sold good8. 
(1) Except as provided in Subsections (2) and (3), 
rights of unsecured creditors of the seller with respect 
to goods which have been identified to a contract for 
sale are subject to the buyer's rights to recover the 
goods under this chapter (Sections 70A-2-502 and 
70A-2-716). 
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erations or if they are products of crops or live-
stock in their unmanufactured states (such as 
ginned cotton, wool-clip, maple syrup, milk and 
eggs), and if they are in the possession of a debtor 
engaged in raising, fattening, grazing or other 
farming operations. If goods are farm products 
they are neither equipment nor inventory; 
(4) "inventory" if they are held by a person 
who holds them for sale or lease or to be fur-
nished under contracts of service or if he hus so 
furnished them, or if they are raw materials, 
work in process or materials used or consumed in 
a business. Inventory of a person is not to be clas-
sified as his equipment. i&es 
70A-9-110. Sufficiency of description. 
For the purposes of this chapter any description of 
personal property or, except as otherwise required by 
Subsection (1) of Section 70A-9-402 relating to the 
contents of a financing statement, real estate is suffi-
cient whether or not it is specific if it reasonably iden-
tifies what is described. 1965 
70A-9-111. Applicability of bulk transfer laws. 
The creation of a security interest is not a bulk 
transfer under Chapter 6 (see Section 70A-6-103). 
1965 
70A-9-112. Where collateral is not owned by 
debtor. 
Unless otherwise agreed, when a secured party 
.knows that collateral is owned by a person who is not 
the debtor, the owner of the collateral is entitled to 
receive from the secured party any surplus under Sec-
tion 70A-9-502(2) or under Section 70A-9-504(l), and 
is not liable for the debt or for any deficiency after 
resale, and he has the same right as the debtor 
(a) to receive statements under Section 
70A-9-208; 
(b) to receive notice of and to object to a se-
cured parly's proposal to retain the collateral in 
satisfaction of the indebtedness under Section 
70A-9.605; 
(c) to redeem the collateral under Section 
70A-9-506; 
(d) to obtain injunctive or other relief under 
section 70A-9-507U); and 
(e) to recover losses caused to him under Sec-
tion 70A-9-208(2). less 
70A-9-113. Security interests arising under 
chapter on Sales. 
A security interest arising solely under the chapter 
on Sales (Chapter 2) is subject to the provisions of 
this chapter except that to the extent that and so long 
as the debtor does not have or does not lawfully ob-
tain possession of the goods 
(a) no security agreement is necessary to make 
the security interest enforceable; and 
(b) no filing is required to perfect the security 
interest; and 
(c) the rights of the secured party on default by 
the debtor are governed by the chapter on Sales 
(Chapter 2). loss 
70A-9-114. Cons ignment 
(1) A person who delivers goods under a consign-
ment which is not a security interest and who would 
be required to file under this chapter by Paragraph 
(3)(c) of Section 70A-2-326 has priority over a secured 
party who is or becomes a creditor of the consignee 
and who would have a perfected security interest in 
the goods if they were the property of the consignee, 
and also has priority with respect to identifiable cash 
proceeds received on or before delivery of the goods to 
a buyer, if | 
(a) the consignor;complies with the filing pro-
vision of the chapter on sales with respect to con-
signments (Paragraph (3)(c) of Section 
70A-2-326) before the consignee receives posses-
sion of the goods; and 
(b) the consignor gives notification in writing 
to the holder of the Security interest if the holder 
has filed a financing statement covering the 
same types of goods before the date of the filing 
made by the consignor, and 
(c) the holder of the security interest receives 
the notification within five years before the con-
signee receives possession of the goods; and 
(d) the notification states that the consignor 
expects to deliver goods on consignment to the 
consignee, describing the goods by item or type. 
(2) In the case of a consignment which is not a 
security interest and in which the requirements of 
the preceding subsection have not been met, a person 
who delivers goods to another is subordinate to a per* 
son who would have a perfected security interest in 
the goods if they were the property of the debtor. 
Iff? 
P^RT 2 
VALIDITY OF SECURITY AGREE-
MENT AND RIGHTS OF 
PARTIES THERETO 
Section 
70A-9-201. General validity of security agreement 
70A-9-202. Title to collateral immaterial. 
70A-9-203. Attachment and enforceability of secu-
rity interest — Proceeds, formal requi-
sites. 
70A-9-204. After-acquired property — Future ad-
vances. 
70A-9-205. Use or disposition of collateral without 
accounting permissible. 
70A-9-206. Agreement not to assert defenses 
against assignee — Modification of 
sales warranties where security 
agreement exists. 
70A-9-207. Rights and duties when collateral is in 
secured party's possession. 
70A-9-208. Request for statement of account ortfist 
of collateral. 
70A-9-201. General validity of security agree-
ment. 
Except as otherwise provided by this act a security 
agreement is effective according to its terms between 
the parties, against purchasers of the collateral and 
against creditors..Nothing in this chapter validates 
any charge or practice illegal under any statute or 
regulation thereunder governing usury, small loans, 
retail installment sales, or the like, or extends the 
application of any such statute or regulation to any 
transaction not otherwise subject thereto. is«5 
70A-9-202. Title to collateral immaterial. 
Each provision of this chapter with regard to 
rights, obligations and remedies applies whether title 
to collateral is in the secured party or in the debtor. 
1»66 
70A-9-203. Attachment and enforceability of se-
curity Interest «- Proceeds, formal req-
uisites. 
(1) Subject to the provisions of Section 70A-4-208 
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on the security interest of a collecting bank and Sec-
tion 70A-9-113 on a security interest arising under 
the chapter on sales, a security interest is not enforce-
able against the debtor or third parties with respect 
to the collateral and does not attach unless 
(a) the collateral is in the possession of the se-
cured party pursuant to agreement, or the debtor 
has signed a security agreement which contains 
a description of the collateral and in addition, 
when the security interest covers crops growing 
or to be grown or timber to be cut, a description of 
the land concerned; and 
(b) value has been given; and 
(c) the debtor has rights in the collateral. 
(2) A security interest attaches when it becomes 
enforceable against the debtor with respect to the col-
lateral. Attachment occurs as soon as all of the events 
specified in Subsection (1) have taken place unless 
explicit agreement postpones the time of attaching. 
(3) Unless otherwise agreed a security agreement 
gives the secured party the rights to proceeds pro-
vided by Section 70A-9-306. 
(4) A transaction, although subject to this chapter, 
is also subject to the Utah Uniform Consumer Credit 
Code, and in the case of conflict between the provi-
sions of this chapter and the Utah Uniform Consumer 
Credit Code, the provisions of the latter statute con-
trol. Failure to comply with any applicable statute 
has only the effect which is specified therein. 1977 
70A-9-204. After-acquired property — Future 
advances. 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), a security 
agreement may provide that any or all obligations 
covered by the security agreoment are to be secured 
by afler-acquired collateral. 
(2) No security interest attaches under an after-ac-
quired property clause to consumer goods other than 
accessions (Section 70A-9-314) when given as addi-
tional security unless the debtor acquires rights in 
them within ten days after the secured party gives 
value. 
(3) Obligations covered by a security agreement 
may include future advances or other value whether 
or not the advances or value are given pursuant to 
commitment (Subsection (1) of Section 70A-9-105). 
1977 
70A-9-205. Use or disposition of collateral with-
out accounting permissible. 
A security interest is not invalid or fraudulent 
against creditors by reason of liberty in the debtor to 
use, commingle or dispose of all or part of the collat-
eral (including returned or repossessed goods) or to 
collect or compromise accounts or chattel paper, or to 
accept the return of goods or make repossessions, or 
to use, commingle or dispose of proceeds, or by reason 
of the failure of the secured party to require the 
debtor to account for proceeds or replace collateral. 
This section does not relax the requirements of pos-
session where oerfection of a security interest de-
pends upon possession of the collateral by the secured 
party or by a bailee. 1977 
70A-9-206. Agreement not to assert de fenses 
against assignee — Modification of 
sales warranties where security agree-
ment exists. 
(1) Subject to any statute or decision which estab-
lishes a different rule for buyers or lessees of con-
sumer goods, an agreement by a buyer or lessee that 
he will not assert against an assignee nny claim or 
defense which he may have against the seller or les-
sor js enforceable by an assignee who takes his as-
signment for value, in good faith and without notice 
of a claim or defense, except as to defenses of a type 
whilh may be asserted against a holder in due course 
of a negotiable instrument under the chapter on Com-
mercial Paper (Chapter 3). A buyer who as part of one 
transaction signs both a negotiable instrument arid a 
security agreement makes such an agreement. 
(2) When a seller retains a purchase money secu-
rity interest in goods the chapter on Sales (Chapter 2) 
governs the sale and any disclaimer, limitation or 
modification of the seller's warranties. l»«s 
70A-9-207. Rights and duties when collateral la 
in secured party's possession. 
(1) A secured party must use reasonable care in 
the custody and preservation of collateral in his poa-
8 e s s i o n . In the case of an instrument or chattel paper 
reasonable care includes taking necessary steps to 
preserve rights against prior parties unless otherwise 
agreed. 
(2) Unless otherwise agreed, when collateral Is in 
the secured party's possession 
(a) reasonable expenses (including the cost of 
any insurance and payment of taxes or other 
charges) incurred in the custody, preservation, 
use or operation of the collateral are chargeable 
to the debtor and are secured by the collateral; 
(b) the risk of accidental lots or damage is on 
the debtor to the extent of any deficiency in any 
effective insurance coverage; 
(c) the secured party may hold as additional 
security any increase or profits (except money) 
received from the collateral, but money so re-
ceived, unless remitted to the debtor, shall, be 
applied in reduction of the'secured obligation; 
(d) the secured party must keep the collateral 
identifiable but fungible collateral may be com-
mingled; 
(e) the secured party may repledge the collat-
eral upon terms which do not impair the debtor's 
right to redeem it. 
(3) A secured party is liable for any loss caused by 
his failure to meet any obligation imposed by the pre-
ceding subsections but does not lose his security in-
terest. 
(4) A secured party may use or operate the collat-
eral for the purpose of preserving the collateral or its 
valt*e o r pursuant to the order of a court of appropri-
ate jurisdiction or, except in the case of consumer 
goods, in the manner and to the extent provided in 
the security agreement. lses 
70A-9-208. Request for statement of account or 
list of collateral. 
(}) A debtor may sign a statement indicating what 
he thieves to be the aggregate amount of unpaid in-
debtedness as of a specified date and may send it to 
the secured party with a request that the statement 
be approved or corrected and returned to the debtor. 
When Che security agreement or any other record 
kept by the secured party identifies the collateral a 
debtor may similarly request the secured party to ap-
prove or correct a list of the collateral. 
(2) The secured party must comply with such a re-
quest within two weeks after receipt by sending a 
written correction or approval. If the secured party 
claims a security interest in all of a particular type of 
collateral owned by the debtor he may indicate that 
fact in his reply and need not approve or correct an 
itemized list of such collateral. If the secured party 
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run shall not be included. The last day of the period 
so computed shall be included, unless it is a Saturday, 
a Sunday, or a legal holiday, in which event the pe-
riod runs until the end of the next day which is not a 
Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday. When the 
period of time prescribed or allowed is less than seven 
days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays and legal hol-
idays shall be excluded in the computation. 
(b) Enlargement When by these rules or by a no-
tice given thereunder or by order of the court an act is 
required or allowed to be done at or within a specified 
time, the court for cause shown may at any time in its 
discretion (1) with or without motion or notice order 
the period enlarged if request therefor is made before 
the expiration of the period originally prescribed or 
aa extended by a previous order or (2) upon motion 
made after the expiration of the specified period per-
mit the act to be done where the failure to act was the 
result of excusable neglect; but it may not extend the 
time for taking any action under Rules 50(b), 52(b), 
69(b), (d) and (e), 60(b) and 73(a) and (g), except to the 
extent and under the conditions stated in them. 
(c) Unaffected by expiration of term. The period 
of time provided for the doing of any act or the taking 
of any proceeding is not affected or limited by the 
continued existence or expiration of a term of court. 
Hie continued existence or expiration of a term of 
court in no way affects the power of a court to do any 
act or take any proceeding in any civil action which 
has been pending before i t 
(d) For motions — Affidavits. A written motion, 
other than one which may be heard ex parte, and 
notice of the hearing thereof shall be served not later 
than 5 days before the time specified for the hearing, 
unless a different period is fixed by these rules or by 
order of the court Such an order may for cause shown 
be made on ex parte application. When a motion is 
supported by affidavit, the affidavit shall be served 
with the motion; and, except as otherwise provided in 
Rule 59(c), opposing affidavits may be served not 
later than 1 day before the hearing, unless the court 
permits them to be served at some other time. 
(e) Additional time after service by mail. When-
ever a party has the right or is required to do some 
act or take some proceedings within a prescribed pe-
riod alter the service of a notice or other paper upon 
him and the notice or paper is served upon him by 
mail, 3 days shall be added to the prescribed period. 
PART III. 
PLEADINGS, MOTIONS, AND ORDERS. 
Rule 7. Pleadings allowed; form of motions. 
(a) Pleadings. There shall be a complaint and an 
answer; a reply to a counterclaim denominated as 
such; an answer to a cross-claim, if the answer con-
tains a cross-claim; a third-party complaint, if a per-
son who was not an original party is summoned un-
der the provisions of Rule 14; and a third-party an-
swer, if a third-party complaint is served. No other 
pleading shall be allowed, except that the court may 
order a reply to an answer or a third-party answer. 
(b) Motions, orders and other papers. 
(1) Motions. An application to the court for an 
order shall be by motion which, unless made dur-
ing a hearing or trial, shall be made in writing, 
shall state with particularity the grounds there-
for, and shall set forth the relief or order sought. 
The requirement of writing is fulfilled if the mo-
tion is stated in a written notice of the hearing of 
the motion. 
(2) Orders. An order includes every direction 
of the court including a minute order made and 
entered in writing and not included in a judg-
ment. An order for the payment of money may be 
enforced by execution in the same manner as if it 
were a judgment. Except as otherwise specifi-
cally provided by these rules, any order made 
without notice to the adverse party may be va-
cated or modified without notice by the judge 
who made it, or may be vacated or modified on 
notice. 
(3) Hearings on motions or order* to show 
cause. When on the day fixed for the hearing of a 
motion or an order to show cause, the judge be* 
fore whom such motion or order is to be heard is 
unable to hear the parties, the matter shall stand 
continued until the further order of the court, or 
it may be transferred by the court or judge to 
some other judge of the court for such hearing. 
(4) Application of rules to motions, orders, 
and other papers. The rules applicable to cap-
tions, signing!, and other matters of form of 
pleadings apply to all motions, orders, and other 
papers provided for by these rules. 
(c) Demurrers, pleas, etc., abolished. Demur-
rers, pleas, and exceptions for insufficiency of a plead* 
ing shall not be used. 
Rule 8. General rules of pleadings. 
(a) Claims for relief. A pleading which sets forth 
a claim for relief, whether an original claim, counter-
claim, cross-claim or third-party claim, shall contain 
(1) a short and plain statement of the claim showing 
that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (2) a demand 
for judgment for the relief to which he deems himself 
entitled. Relief in the alternative or of several differ-
ent types may be demanded. 
(b) Defenses; form of denials. A party shall state 
in short and plain terms his defenses to each claim 
asserted and shall admit or deny the averments upon 
which the adverse party relies. If he is without 
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief 
as to the truth of an averment, he shall so state and 
this has the effect of a denial. Denials shall fairly 
meet the substance of the averments denied. When a 
pleader intends in good faith to deny only a part or a 
qualification of an averment, he shall specify so much 
of it as is true and material and shall deny only the 
remainder. Unless the pleader intends in good faith 
to controvert all the averments of the preceding 
pleading, he may make his denials as specific denials 
of designated averments or paragraphs, or he may 
generally deny all the averments except such desig-
nated averments or paragraphs as he expressly ad-
mits; but, when he does so intend to controvert all its 
averments, he may do so by general denial subject to 
the obligations set forth in Rule 11. 
(c) Affirmative defenses. In pleading to a preced-
ing pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively ac-
cord and satisfaction, arbitration and award, assump-
tion of risk, contributory negligence, discharge in 
bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, failure of consideration, 
fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant, laches, li-
cense, payment, release, res judicata, statute of 
frauds, statute of limitations, waiver, and any other 
matter constituting an avoidance of affirmative de-
fense. When a party has mistakenly designated a de-
fense as a counterclaim or a counterclaim as a de-
fense, the court on terms, if justice so requires, shall 
treat the pleadings as if there had been a proper des-
ignation. 
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could have been set up, the two demands shall be 
deemed compensated so far as they equal each other, 
and neither can be deprived of the benefit thereof by 
the assignment or death of the other, except as pro-
vided in Subdivision (j) of this rule. 
(j) Claims against assignee. Except as otherwise 
provided by law as to negotiable instruments and as-
signments of accounts receivable, any claim, counter-
claim, or cross-claim which could have boon assorted 
against an assignor at the time of or before notice of 
such assignment, may be asserted against his as-
signee, to the extent that such claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim does not exceed recovery upon the claim 
of the assignee. 
(k) Claim in excess of court's jurisdiction. 
Where any counterclaim or cross-claim or third-party 
claim is filed in an action in a city court or justice's 
court, and due to its limited jurisdiction, such court 
does not have the power to grant the relief sought 
thereby, it shall suspend all proceedings in the entire 
action and certify the same and transmit all papers 
therein to the district court of the county in which 
such inferior court is maintained, upon the payment 
by the party filing such counterclaim, cross-claim or 
third-party claim of the fees required for certifying 
the record on appeal from such court and for docket-
ing the same in the district court. The fees herein 
required to be paid, shall be deposited with the clerk 
of the inferior court at the time of filing such counter-
claim, cross-claim, or third-party claim. For failure so 
to do, the court may, upon motion of the adverse 
party, after notice, strike such counterclaim, cross-
claim, or third-party claim. 
In any action so certified to the district court, when 
any responsive pleading is required or permitted or a 
motion is allowed under these rules, the time in 
which such responsive pleading or motion shall be 
made shall commence to run from the time notice of 
the filing of the cause in the district court shall be 
served on the party making such responsive pleading 
or motion. 
Rule 14. Third-party practice. 
. (a) When defendant may bring in third party. 
At any time after commencement of the action a de-
fendant, as a third-party plaintiff, may cause a sum-
mons and complaint to be served upon a person not a 
party to the action who is or may be liable to him for 
all or part of the plaintiffs claim against him. The 
third-party plaintiff need not obtain leave to make 
the service if he files the third-party complaint not 
later than ten days after he serves his original an-
swer. Otherwise he must obtain leave on motion upon 
notice to all parties to the action. The person served 
with the summons and third-party complaint, herein-
after called the third-party defendant, shall make his 
defenses to the third-party plaintiffs claim as pro-
vided in Rule 12 and his counterclaims against the 
third-party plaintiff and cross-claims against other 
third-party defendants as provided in Rule 13. The 
\hiTd-party dfcfe&d&x& may fcaaeit &%%\i\&t tta p\*\T\-
tiffany defenses which the third-party plaintiff has to 
the plaintiffs claim. The third-party defendant may 
also assert any claim against the plaintiff arising out 
of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject 
matter of the plaintiffs claim against the third-party 
plaintiff. The plaintiff may assert any claim against 
the third-party defendant arising out of the transac-
tion or occurrence that is the subject matter of the 
plaintiffs claim against the third-party plaintiff, and 
the third-party defendant thereupon shall assert his 
defenses as provided in Rule 12 and his counterclaims 
an<l cross-claims as provided in Rule 13. A third-
party defendant may proceed under this rule against 
any person not a party to the action who is or may be 
liable to him for all or part of the claim made in the 
action against the third-party defendant 
(b) When plaintiff may bring in third party. 
When a counterclaim is asserted against a plaintiff, 
he may cause a third party to be brought in under 
circumstances which under this rule would entitle a 
defendant to do so. 
Rule 15, Amended and supplemental pleadlnfa, 
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his plead-
ing once as a matter of course at any time before a 
responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one 
to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the 
action has not been placed upon the trial calendar, he 
may so amend it at any time within 20 days after it is 
served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading 
only by leave of court or by written consent of the 
adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when 
justice so requires. A party shall plead in response to 
an amended pleading within the time remaining for 
response to the original pleading or within 10 days 
after service of the amended pleading, whichever pe-
riod may be the longer, unless the court otherwise 
orders. 
(b) Amendments to conform to the evidence. 
When issues not raised by the pleading are tried by 
express or implied consent of the parties, they shall 
be treated in ail respects as If they had been raised in 
the pleadings. Such amendments of the pleadings as 
may be necessary to cause them to conform to the 
evidence and to raise these issues may oe made upon 
motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; 
but failure so to amend does not affect the result of 
the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at 
the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues 
made by the pleadings, the court may allow the 
pleadings to be amended when the presentation of the 
merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the 
objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the ad-
mission of such evidence would prejudice him in 
maintaining his action or defense upon the merits. 
The court shall grant a continuance, if necessary, to 
enable the objecting party to meet such evidence. 
(c) Relation back of amendments. Whenever the 
claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading 
arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence 
set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original 
pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of 
the original pleading. 
(d) Supplemental pleadings. Upon motion of a 
party the court may, upon reasonable notice and upon 
such terms as are just, permit him to serve a supple-
mental pleading setting forth transactions or occur-
rences or events which have happened since the date 
of the pleading sought to be supplemented. Permis-
sion may be granted even though the original plead-
ing is defective in its statement of a claim for relief or 
deform-1£ \iifc tourV usem* ft fcdvia&YAe \h&t Mb* ad-
verse party plead to the supplemental pleading, it 
shall so order, specifying the time therefor. 
Rale 16. Pretrial conferences, scheduling, and 
management conferences. 
(a) Pretrial conferences. In any action, the court 
in its discretion or upon motion of a party, may direct 
the attorneys for the parties and any unrepresented 
parties to appear before it for a conference or confer-
ences before trial for such purposes as: 
(1) expediting the disposition of the action; 
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addition, shall describe specifically the nature of the 
case, the issues presented, and any special reasons 
the parties may have for an expedited decision. The 
court may, in the absence of a motion or stipulation, 
dispose of any case under this rule sua sponte. 
(b) Cases which qualify for expedited decision. 
Appeals involving uncomplicated factual issues based 
primarity tm docvuiteTiVa, B\rrcYmfcT^  iudgTrveiAs, dis-
missals for failure to state a claim, dismissals for lack 
of personal or subject matter jurisdiction, and judg-
ments or orders based on uncomplicated issues of law 
are, in general, of a type which the court will consider 
on a motion for expedited decision. In all motions 
brought under this rule, the substantive rules of law 
should be deemed settled, although the parties may 
differ as to their application. 
(c) Appeals ineligible for expedited decision. 
The court will not grant a motion for an expedited 
appeal in cases raising substantive constitutional is-
sues, issues of significant public interest, issues of 
law of first impression, or complicated issues of fact or 
law or in criminal cases. 
(d) Procedure if expedited motion is granted. If 
a motion for expedited decision is granted by the 
court, the appeal will be given an expedited setting 
for oral argument within 45 to 60 days from the date 
of the order granting the motion. Within two days 
after submission of the appeal, the court will confer-
ence, decide the case, and issue a written order which 
need not be accompanied by an opinion. Entry of the 
order by the clerk in the records of the court shall 
constitute the entry of the judgment of the court. 
(e) Precedential effect. Appeals decided under 
this rule without written opinions will not stand as 
precedent of the court hut, m other respects, wiYt have 
the same force and effect as other decisions of the 
court. 
(0 Issuance of written opinion. If it appears to 
the court alter the case has been submitted for deci-
sion that a written opinion should be issued, the time 
limitation in Paragraph (d) shall not apply, and the 
parties will be so notified. 
Rule 32. Interest on judgment 
Unless otherwise provided by law, if a judgment for 
money in a civil case is affirmed, any interest allowed 
by law shall be payable from the date the judgment 
was entered in the district court, juvenile court, or 
circuit court. 
Rule 33. Damages for delay or frivolous appeal; 
recovery of attorney fees. 
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. If 
the court determines that a motion made or an appeal 
taken under these rules is either frivolous or for de-
lay, it shall award just damages and single or double 
costs, including reasonable attorney fees, to the pre-
vailing party. 
(b) Disciplinary action for inadequate repre-
sentation. The court may impose appropriate sanc-
tions against any counsel who inadequately repre-
sents a client on appeal. 
Rule 34. Award of costs. 
(a) To whom allowed. Except as otherwise pro-
vided by law, if an appeal is dismissed, costs shall be 
taxed against the appellant unless otherwise agreed 
by the parties or ordered by the court; if a judgment 
or order is affirmed, costs shall be taxed against the 
appellant unless otherwise ordered; if a judgment or 
order is reversed, costs shall be taxed against the re-
spondent unless otherwise ordered; if a judgment or 
order is affirmed or reversed in part or is vacated, 
costs shall be allowed as ordered by the court. Costs 
shall not be allowed or taxed in a criminal case. 
(b) Costs for and against state of Utah. In cases 
involving the state of Utah or an agency or officer 
thereof, an award of costs for or against the state 
shall be at the discretion of the court unless specifi-
cally required or prohibited by law. 
\c> COBVB of brief* and attachments, -record, 
bonds, and other expenses on appeal. The follow-
ing may be taxed as costs in favor of the prevailing 
party in the appeal: the actual costs of a printed or 
typewritten brief and attachments, not to exceed 
$3.00 for each page; actual costs incurred in the prep-
aration and transmission of the record, including 
costs of the reporter's transcript unless otherwise or-
dered by the court; premiums paid for supersedeas or 
cost bonds to preserve rights pending appeal; and the 
fees for filing and docketing the appeal. 
(d) Bill of costs taxed after remittitur. When 
costs are awarded to a party in an appeal from a dis-
trict court, juvenile court, or circuit court, a party 
claiming costs shall, within 15 days after the remitti-
tur is filed with the clerk of the court from which the 
appeal was taken, serve upon the adverse party and 
file with the clerk of that court an itemized and veri-
fied bill of costs. The adverse party may, within five 
days of service of the bill of costs, serve and file a 
notice of objection, together with a motion to have the 
costs taxed by the district courty juvenile court, or 
circuit court. If there is no objection to the cost bill 
within the allotted time, the clerk of that court shall 
tax the costs as filed and enter judgment for the party 
entitled thereto, which judgment shall be entered in 
the judgment docket with the same force and effect as 
in the case of other judgments of record. If the cost 
bill of the prevailing party is timely.; opposed, the 
clerk, upon reasonable notice and hearing, shall tax 
the costs and enter a final determination and judg-
ment which shall thereupon be entered in the judg-
ment docket with the same force and effect as in the 
case of other judgments of record. The determination 
of the clerk shall be reviewable by the district court, 
juvenile court, or circuit court upon the request of 
either party made within five days of the entry of the 
judgment. 
(e) Costs in other proceedings and agency ap-
peals. In all other matters before the Court of Ap-
peals, including appeals from an agency, costs may be 
allowed as in cases on appeal from a district court, 
juvenile court, or circuit court. Within 16 days after 
the expiration of the time in which a petition for re-
hearing may be filed or within 15 days after an order 
denying such a petition, the party to whom costs have 
been awarded may file with the clerk of the Court of 
Appeals and serve upon the adverse party an item-
ized and verified bill of costs. The adverse party may, 
within five days after the service of the bill of costs, 
file a notice of objection an.d a motion to have the 
costs taxed by the clerk. If no objection to the cost bill 
is filed within the allotted time, the clerk shall there-
upon tax the costs and enter judgment against the 
adverse party. If the adverse party timely objects to 
the cost bill, the clerk, upon reasonable notice and 
hearing, shall determine and settle the costs and tax 
the same, and a judgment shall be entered thereon 
against the adverse party. The determination by the 
clerk shall be reviewable by the Court of Appeals 
upon the request of either party made within five 
days of the entry of judgment; unless otherwise or-
dered, oral argument shall not be permitted A judg-
ment under this section may be filed with the clerk of 
any district court in the state, who shall docket a 
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A.
 VW. Lauritzen (1906) 
Attorney for 
326 North 100 East 
P. Or Box 171 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (801) 753-3391 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
BOX ELDER COUNTY , BRIGHAM CITY DEPARTMENT 
CARL BAKER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DALE BARNES dba BARNS 
EQUIPMENT 
Defendant. 
) COMPLAINT 
) No. 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff and for a cause of action alleges: 
1. That Plaintiff is a resident of I Cache County State of 
Utah and the Defendant is a resident of Box Elder County, State 
of Utah and the cause of action arose in Bojc Elder County and the 
amount in controversy is less that $10,000.00 
2. That on or about the 7th day of Juhe, 1986 the Defendant 
sold to the Plaintiff certain equipment more particularly 
described as one International Harvester tractor model 706 and 
one pair of John Deere twin rakes models 270 & 271 with cart. 
That Plaintiff has paid toward the aforesaid described equipment 
a total of $5500.00 but Defendant has failed to deliver said 
equipment whereby the Plaintiff has been damaged in the amount of 
$5500.00 together with interest from and after the 7th day of 
June 1986 at the rate of 12%. 
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WHEREFORE Plaintiff demands judgment against the Defendant 
in the amount 05500.00 together with interest and his costs, 
DATED this ^ day of May, 1987. 
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J;-. JUN2 4 198/ i j | j 
Jeff R. Thome of Mann, Hadfield & Thome, #3250 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Zions Bank Building, 98 North Main 
P. 0. Box "F" 
Brigham City, Utah 84302-0906 
Telephone 723-3404 
IN THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT, BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BRIGHAM CITY DEPARTMENT 
CARL BAKER, 
vs. 
DALE BARNES 
EQUIPMENT, 
Plaintiff, 
dba BARNS 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
GENERAL ANSWER 
Civil No. 
Comes now the defendant and answers the complaint of 
the plaintiff on file herein and for said answer admits, 
denies and alleges as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
That said Complaint fails to state a cause of action 
upon which relief can be granted. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
1. Answering each paragraph thereunder, the defendant 
admits that the plaintiff is indebted in the amount of 
$4,500.00 together with interest from and after June 7, 1986 
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at the highest legal rate. Defendant denies the balance of 
said allegations. 
DATED this £? day of June, 1987. 
Je r W^i VTho rn e 
MANN*, HADFIELD & THORNE 
Attorneys for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing 
General Answer to A. W. Lauritzen, Attorney for Plaintiff, 
P. 0. Box 171, Logan, Utah 84321, this 22nd day of June, 1987 
^yfrv J^Y'/^'-^G -*t~Y 
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leoLrtrL! 
Jeff R. Thome of Mann, Hadfield & Thome, #3 250 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Zions Bank Building, 98 North Main 
P. 0. Box "F" 
Brigham City, Utah 84302-0906 
Telehone 723-3404 
IN THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT, BOX ELDER COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, BRIGHAM CITY DEPARTMENT 
CARL BAKER, 
VS. 
DALE BARNES 
EQUIPMENT, 
Plaintiff, 
dba BARNES 
Defendant. 
) POST TRIAL BRIEF 
) Civil No. 873000183 CV 
Comes now the defendant and submits the following post 
trial brief. 
FACTS 
The testimony in the trial conclusively established as 
facts the following items. 
1. On or about June 7, 198 6 Carl Baker came to the 
place ,of business of Barnes Equipment in Tremonton, Utah 
with the intention of purchasing a tractor. 
2. After some discussion, and after Mr. Baker has test 
driven the tractor, he agreed to purchase an International 
Parmall Tractor, Model 706, Serial No. 7780SY, for the sum 
of $6,000.00. Mr. Baker also purchased one pair of John 
2R 
Deere Twin Rakes, Model 270 and 271, with rake cart for 
$4,000.00. 
3. Mr. Baker traded in a Heston Swather for $4,500.00 
credit and an International Harvester Side Rake for 
$1,000.00 credit. 
4. Mr. Baker owed to Mr. Barnes as of June 7, 1986, 
$4,500.00. 
5; Mr. Baker indicated that he wanted to obtain his 
own financing on the equipment and told Mr. Barnes that he 
would obtain financing. 
6. By Bakers1 own admission at trial, he stated that 
he felt it would take 60 to 90 days to get financing 
accomplished. (Mr. Barnes1 testimony was to the effect that 
there was no agreed time for refinancing, but that he felt 
financing should have been accomplished within 30 days and 
after 30 days interest should accrue on the debt. 
7. The Farmall Tractor was delivered on June 7, 1986, 
the date the agreement was reached, and within a week the 
twin rakes were delivered, and within a week thereafter the 
trade-in items were obtained by Mr. Barnes from Baker. 
8. Mr. Baker knew that he had to pay the $4,50 0.00 and 
claimed to have been making arrangements with his bank for 
financing. Mr. Baker admitted that Mr. Barnes claimed an 
interest in the property until they were paid for, and that 
Mr. Baker had stated to Mr. Barnes that he would obtain 
financing on the equipment* 
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9. Mr. Barnes testified that he repeatedly tried to 
contact Mr. Baker and met with him on at least two occasions 
and gave him credit applications so that he could begin 
financing the equipment. 
10. Mr. Baker admitted that he did obtain a credit 
report on at least one occasion but he did not fill it out 
since he was seeking financing through Commercial Security 
Bank. 
11. Mr. Barnes further testified that he made 
approximately 40 phone calls to try to locate Mr. Baker to 
try to get him to finance the equipment, that he had two 
meetings set up but Mr. Baker never appeared, and that he 
could never pin Mr. Baker down to get financing 
accomplished on the equipment. 
12. Mr. Baker testified that on approximately 
September 15, 1986 Mr. Barnes came back and picked up the 
property sold. Mr. Barnes testified that he repossessed the 
equipment on November 15, 198 6. 
POINT I 
THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN DALE BARNES 
AS SELLER AND CARL BAKER AS BUYER 
CONSTITUTES A SECURITY AGREEMENT, 
The Uniform Commercial Code is extremely liberal 
regarding the requirements as to what constitutes a 
"security agreement". The reasons for this are that the 
drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code recognized that the 
actual business transactions between buyers and sellers 
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often fail to get written documents signed, and the drafters 
felt that it would be unfair to penalize someone just 
because they did not have an explicit written document, see 
official comment to U.C.C. Comment under § 2-201. 
UTAH CODE ANNO. § 70A-9-105(h) states: 
"Security agreement" means an agreement which 
creates or provides for a security interest" 
An agreement is a defined term under the Commercial 
Code. Section 70A-1-201(3) states: 
"Agreement" means the bargain of the parties in 
fact as found in their language or by implication 
from other circumstances including course of 
dealing of usage of trade or course of performance 
as provided in this act (sections 70A-1-205 and 
70A-2-208). Whether an agreement has legal 
consequences is determined by the provisions of 
this act, if applicable; otherwise by the law of 
contracts (section 70A-1-103). (Compare 
"Contract"). 
Thus an "agreement" is basically the parties "bargain". 
Security interest is also defined a term. UTAH CODE ANNO. 
§70A-1-201(37) states: 
"Security interest" means an interest in personal 
property or fixtures which secures payment or 
performance of an obligation...." 
From the evidence it is clear that the parties intended that 
Dale Barnes would retain an interest in the property until 
he was paid in full, and thus, a security agreement existed 
and the parties rights are governed by the Utah Commercial 
Code. 
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The statute of frauds provisions of the Utah Commercial 
Code, see UTAH CODE ANNO. §7 0A-2-201 provides a minimum of 
requirements to have an enforceable contract. These minimum 
legal requirements are: 
(a) A writing; 
(b) Signed by the party against who it is enforced; 
(c) A description of the collateral. 
Under subparagraph 70A-2-201(2), if between merchants within 
a reasonable time a writing in confirmation of the cohtract 
and sufficient against the sender is received and the party 
receiving it has reason to know its contents, it satisfies 
the requirements of subsection (1) unless the party objects 
to it. Thus when Barnes mailed the invoice to Baker (PI. 
Ex. A) and Baker failed to object it bound him. 
Then conclusively 70A-2-201 (3) (b)& (c) recognizes part 
performance and also recognizes that if a party admits in 
its pleadings or testimony that a contract exists, that it 
satisfies the statutes of fraud provisions and the agreement 
is legally enforceable. 
Thus the formal requirements for a contract have 
clearly been met inasmuch as plaintiff's Exhibit A evidences 
the agreement between the parties that Carl Baker was to 
receive a tractor and rakes and traded in a swather and side 
rake and that he owed Dales Barnes $4,500.00. Additionally 
Carl Baker admitted in his pleadings and in his testimony 
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that an agreement existed and Dale Barnes claimed an 
interest in the equipment. Therefore, there can be no 
mistake that a "contract" and "security agreement11 existed 
between the plaintiff and defendant, 
POINT II 
DALE BARNES WAS LEGALLY ENTITLED 
TO REPOSSESS THE PROPERTY ON 
DEFAULT. 
Uniform Commercial Code recognizes that |all terms to a 
contract may not be in writing. The official comments to 
the Uniform Commercial Code states: 
"The required writing need not contain all the 
materials and terms of the contract and such 
material terms as are stated need not be precisely 
stated. All that is required is that the writing 
afford a basis for believing that the offerdoral 
evidence rest upon a real transaction." See 
Official Comments Uniform Commercial Code, UTAH 
CODE ANNO. §70A-2-201 Comment No. ^. 
The main difference of opinion in this trial between Baker 
and Barnes was the time in which the $4,500.00 would be 
paid. By his own admission, Baker acknowledged that he 
recognized he would have to pay the amount within 60 to 90 
i. 
days, but both he and Mr. Barnes testifxed that there was no 
specific time set for payment. In this regard Section 
70A-2-309 states the time must be reasonableL 
The official comment under this section states: 
"A time for payment where not agreed upon, is 
related to the time of delivery;11 Comment 2 
Section 70A-2-310 provides: 
"Unless otherwise agreed 
(a) payment is due at the time and place at 
which the buyer is to receive! the goods..." 
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The Uniform Commercial Code §70A-l-203 also imposes an 
obligation of good faith. This section states: 
"Every contract or duty within this act imposes an 
obligation of good faith in its performance or 
enforcement." 
Section 70A-1-204 provides: 
"Whenever this act requires any action to be taken 
within a reasonable time, any time which is not 
manifestly unreasonable may be fixed by 
agreement." 
While there was no specific time agreed to on June 7, 1986, 
when the $4,500.00 was to be paid by Mr. Baker to Mr. 
Barnes, the evidence is clear that Mr. Baker stated that he 
would have his bank finance the machinery and pay off Mr. 
Barnes. Mr. Baker had the machinery for the entire growing 
season of 1986, and by his own testimony the machinery was 
not repossessed until September 15, 1986, a period of 100 
days. It is also clear that Mr. Barnes offered to let Mr. 
Baker have the property that he repossessed if he would pay 
him his amount due together with interest, and even 
continued the offer up to the date of trial. 
By Mr. Baker's version of the facts he had 100 days in 
which to arrange financing and he never did so, and by his 
own admission 60 to 90 days was what he felt was reasonable. 
Mr. Barnes indicated that he felt 30 days was reasonable to 
arrange a time and that he did not in fact repossess the 
machinery until November 15, 1986, a period of 161 days. 
The failure of Baker to act in good faith within a 
reasonable time to finance the equipment constitutes a 
default. 
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The Uniform Commercial Code clearly gives the seller 
the right upon default to repossess the property. UTAH CODE 
ANNO. §70A-9-503 provides: 
"Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on 
default the right to take possession of the 
collateral. In taking possession a secured party 
may proceed without judicial process if this can 
be done without breach of the peace or may proceed 
by action." 
After repossession Baker never complained until April 
28 or 29, 1987, and he was then given the option to pay the 
debt and still get his equipment. 
The Uniform Commercial Code also obligates a secured 
party to dispose of collateral after default in a 
commercially reasonable manner. UTAH CODE ANNO. §70A-9-504. 
After repossession and after reasonable notification of the 
time and place, the secured party may sell the property by 
either public or private sale. Mr. Baker received notice 
that Mr. Barnes intended to try to sell the property and Mr. 
Baker made no effort to reclaim the equipment or to pay the 
debt. 
POINT III 
MR. BARNES IS ENTITLED TO THE 
REASONABLE COSTS OF REPOSSESSING 
THE PROPERTY TOGETHER WITH REPAIR 
COSTS AND INTEREST AT THE RATE OF 
TEN PERCENT (10%) PER ANNUM. 
UTAH CODE ANNO. §15-1-1 provides for interest at the 
rate of ten percent in the absence of a contract specifying 
a different rate. Mr. Barnes further stated that in his 
35 
course of dealings that after 3 0 days interest would accrue. 
Thus, interest began accruing on the $4,500.00 on July 7, 
1986, and accrues interest at the rate of $1.23 per day up 
to date of judgment and then at 12% from judgment until 
paid, 
Mr. Barnes further testified that it took him eight 
hours on Friday and eight hours on Saturday and six hours on 
Monday to ultimately obtain possession of the property and 
repossess the same, and that his hourly rate was $30.00 per 
hour, which would give him repossession charges of $660.00. 
He also testified that it cost him $100.00 to repair the 
rakes. 
Thus, up to the time of trial Mr. Barnes had accrued 
interest of $602.52, repossession charges of $660.00, and 
repair cost of $100.00. When added to the principal amount 
of $4,500.00 this made Mr. Baker indebted to Mr. Barnes in 
the amount of $5,862.52. To the extent that Mr. Barnes is 
able to sell the property for amounts in excess of the 
amount owed, that money would go to Mr. Baker. If Mr. Baker 
honestly believed that the property was so valuable, he 
obviously would have accepted the offer to pay the balance 
owed and take the property. Until such time as Mr. Barnes 
sells the property and is able to determine the costs and 
expenses, he is not able to make any claim against Mr. Baker 
or Mr. Baker make any claim against him. 
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POINT IV 
THE PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO MEET 
THE BURDEN OF PROOF SUFFICIENT TO 
SHOW HIS CASE. 
All contract law can basically be summarized by the 
statement that: 
MA party is entitled to be put in the same 
position he would have been, had the other party 
fully performed the contract," 
In this matter it is clear that Mr. Baker breached the 
contract by failing to finance or otherwise pay to 
Mr. Barnes the amount of money owed. Mr. Barnes was legally 
entitled to repossess the property sold to Mr. Baker and to 
try to sell the same and apply it against the debt owed to 
him. The complaint of the plaintiff does not allege any 
wrongful repossession and claims that: 
"The defendant failed to deliver said equipment 
whereby plaintiff has been damaged in the amount 
of $5,500.00 together with interest from and after 
the 7th day of June, 1986 at the rate of 12%." 
The evidence is adamantly clear that the items were 
delivered; that Mr. Baker used them during the entire farm 
season of 198 6; that he failed to make any payment and that 
he never did obtain any financing (although his testimony 
was that he was trying to); that he knew Mr. Barnes 
repossessed the same and he failed to make any contact; that 
Mr. Barnes sent him registered letters apprising him that he 
could pick up the property by paying the contract balance, 
and that he refused to do so. 
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CONCLUSION 
The defendant therefore requests that the action be 
dismissed and that he be awarded his costs and expenses 
incurred* 
DATPD this 1J day of October, 1987. 
Thorne 
MANN, HADFIELD & THORNE 
Attorneys for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the X I day of October, 
1987, I fnailed a copy of the foregoing Post Trial Brief to 
A. W. Lauritzen, Attorney for Plaintiff, P. 0. Box 171, 
Logan, Utah 84321. 
* / 
Secretary 
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A. W. Lauritzen (1906) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
326 North 100 East 
P. 0. Box 171 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (801) 753-3391 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
BOX ELDER COUNTY, BRIGHAM CITY DEPARTMENT 
CARL BAKER, ) 
Plaintiff, > MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
) PLAINTIFF'S CONTENTIONS 
vs. > 
DALE BARNES dba BARNES, ) 
EQUIPMENT, ) 
Defendant. ) 873000183CV 
ISSUE 
The court has certified a question to the parties regarding 
the right of the seller to reposess absent a conditional sale or 
security agreement and as a corollary proposition whether or not 
the seller retains some sort of equitable, possessory or legal 
interest in goods sold and delivered, such interest to persist 
until payment be made. 
FACTS 
The facts of this case are relatively simple, it seem that 
on or about the 7th day of June the Defendant sold to the 
Plaintiff farm equipment for $10,000.00 and contemporaneously 
received back equipment from the Plaintiff valued at $5500.00 
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crediting it to Plaintiff's account and showing a balanc 
$4500.00, It was agreed between the parties that the $450( 
would be paid by the Plaintiff to the Defendant at some li 
indefinite date, but certainly it seem to have been within 
contemplation of the parties that the payment would have made 
the calendar year 1986. Apparently although his efforts wh 
somewhat desultory, Defendant attempted to contact the Plaint 
without success and the season becoming late the weat 
uncertain the Defendant finally located his equipment and ret< 
the same without actual notice being given to the Plaintiff. 
Plaintiff became aware of the taking shortly after the acti 
event,. Apparently the Defendant then left the area for Arize 
but maintains that someone was always at his place of busine 
although the Defendant maintains that he was unable to find t 
business open. Upon Plaintiff contacting the Defendant when 
returned in the Spring the Defendant told the Plaintiff that l 
was sorry, he had to repossess the equipment and it was no longc 
available and " he owed the Plaintiff nothing". Thereafter in 
change of heart the Defendant directed letters to the Plaintif 
offering to allow the Plaintiff to reclaim his equipment upo 
payment of the balanceof $4500.00 with interest. The Plaintif 
was unwilling and uninterested in taking up this renewed offer, 
he having purchased substitute equipment and having changed his 
position. 
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This suit was then filed. 
ISSUE 
Whether or not an automatic right of repossession remains in 
the seller. 
ARGUMENT 
WHETHER OR NOT AN AUTOMATIC RIGHT OF REPOSSESSION REMAINS IN 
THE SELLER. 
UCA 70A-9-201 through 203 read as follows; 
"GENERAL VALIDITY OF SECURITY 
Except as otherwise provided by this act a security 
agreement is effective according to its terms between 
the parties, against purchasers of the collateral and 
against creditors. Nothing in this chapter validates 
any charge or practice illegal under any statute or 
regulation thereunder governing usury, small loans, 
retail installments sales, or the like, or extends the 
application of any such statute or regulation to any 
transaction not otherwise subject thereto. 
TITLE TO COLLATERAL IMMATERIAL 
Each provision of this chapter with regard to rights, 
obligations and remedies applies whether title to 
collateral is in the secured party or in the debtor. 
ATTACHMENT AND ENFORCEABILITY OF SECURITY INTEREST-
PROCEEDS, FORMAL REQUISITES. 
<1) Subject to the provisions of section 70A-4-208 on 
the security interest of a collecting bank and section 
70A-9-113 on a security interest arising under the 
chapter on ©ales, m oecurity interest la not 
enforceable against the debtor or third parties with 
respect to the collateral and does not attach unless 
(a) the collateral is in the possession of the secured 
party pursuant to agreement, or the debtor has signed a 
security agreement which contains a description of the 
collateral and in addition, when the security interest 
covers crops growing or to be grown or timber to be 
cut, a description of the land concerned; and (b) value 
has been given; and (c) the debtor has rights in the 
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collateral. 
(2) A security interest attaches when it becomes 
enforceable against the debtor with respect to the 
collateral. Attachment occurs as soon as all of the 
events specified in subsection (I) have taken place 
unless explicit agreement postpones the time of 
attaching. 
(3) Unless otherwise agreed a security agreement gives 
the secured party the rights to proceeds provided by 
section 70A-9-306. 
<4) A transaction, although subject to this chapter, 
is also subject to the Utah Uniform Consumer Credit 
Code, and in the case of conflict between the 
provisions of this chapter and the utah Uniform 
Consumer Credit Code, the provisions of the latter 
statute control. Failure to comply with any applicable 
statute has only the effect which is specified therein. 
It is apparent that in order for the secured party to proc 
ma provided in UCA 70A-9-306 the security agreement must be 
writing or that the secured party must retain possession of "t 
collateral pursuant to at least an oral agreement. It appea 
that upon default from the terms of a security agreement t 
secured party would have the right to take possession under Ut 
70A-9-503 and dispose the collateral pursuant to UCA 70A-9-5O 
Each of these sections subsumes that the secured party was i 
compliance with UCA 70A-9-203 quoted above. Nothing apparent t 
Plaintiff's counsel appears in UCA 70A-1-20I or any othe 
provisions of title 70A or any other provision in the Utah Cod< 
Annotated which would alter the requirements of 70A-9-203. As 
was argued by Plaintiff at trial it seem that Plaintiff, as ar 
aggrieved party, could proceed under two theories, that being 
that there a unilateral recision by the retaking of the property 
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which would require the Defendant to once again place the 
Plaintiff in his original position. The other theory would be 
that there was a conversion of the collateral by the Defendant 
raising a right in the Plaintiff to money damages. The evidence 
seems to point to the former, that the Defendant, at least in his 
mind, retained some interest in the property and elected to once 
again restore himself to the possession of the property thereby 
requiring that he once again place the Defendant in Defendants 
position prior to the sale. UCA 70A-2-106 defines a sale as the 
passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a price. If 
Defendant maintains that a sale actually occurred and title 
passed then the Defendant could only be restored to title by way 
of legal process that being an execution pursuant to a judgment. 
If the sale was not complete but was terminated by the act of the 
Defendant or by the Plaintiff and the contract was still 
executory which it would appear that the contract was, then the 
equitable remedies under the doctrine of recision would come into 
play. 
One thing seems apparent, the Defendant may not reclaim his 
own goods and retain both his own goods and those of the 
Plaintiff thereby having the best of two worlds. The court must 
above all, do justice, and it appears that justice at this point 
can only be done by adequately compensating the Plaintiff for 
Plaintiff lost goods. The evidence which is before the court is 
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that his loss goods had a value of $5500.00 and since the gc 
are not available to be restored to the Plaintiff he musi 
compensated for the value of said goods.. 
CONCLUSION 
The court should, in the absence of any statutory author 
for the action of the Defendant, award judgment to the Plaint 
for $5500.00. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED th is C7^ 
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